Federal Jurisdiction: Supreme Court Strains to Provide a Federal Forum for Challenges to State Administration of Welfare Programs by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.




Federal Jurisdiction: Supreme Court Strains to
Provide a Federal Forum for Challenges to State
Administration of Welfare Programs
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Federal Jurisdiction: Supreme Court Strains to Provide a Federal Forum for Challenges to State
Administration of Welfare Programs" (1975). Minnesota Law Review. 3068.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3068
Federal Jurisdiction: Supreme Court Strains to Provide
a Federal Forum for Challenges to State Administration
of Welfare Programs
Petitioner, a recipient of public assistance under the federal-
state Aid to Families with Dependent Children program," chal-
lenged a provision of the New York Code of Rules and Regula-
tions which provided for recoupment by the state of advance wel-
fare grants made to enable recipients to avoid eviction for non-
payment of rent. In order to recoup an advance grant, the state
simply deducted from subsequent disbursements a percentage of
the grant.2 Petitioner alleged that the state regulation was in
conflict with both the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion3 and certain provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935.4
1. The federal government contributes a specified percentage of
the total welfare funds distributed by the state, 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1970),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 603 (Supp. II, 1972), provided that the state
complies with certain federal regulations. Id. § 602.
2. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.7 (g) (7) provided in pertinent part:(g) Payment for services and supplies already received.
Assistance grants shall be made to meet only current needs.
Under the following specified circumstances payment for serv-
ices or supplies already received is deemed a current need:
(7) For a recipient of public assistance who is being evicted
for nonpayment of rent for which a grant has previously is-
sued, an advance grant may be provided to prevent such
eviction or rehouse the family; and such advance shall be
deducted from subsequent grants in equal amounts over not
more than the next six months ....
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 531 & n.2 (1974). The regulation has
since been amended.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The action was brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Petitioner claimed that the statute
discriminated against those needy children whose parents had some-
how spent the advance grant, but whose present need was not reduced.
Brief for Petitioner at 25, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). It ap-
pears well settled, however, that in judging equal protection claims al-
leging deprivation of welfare benefits, the family, not the individual, is
the appropriate unit for measuring the alleged deprivation. Charleston
v. Wohlgemuth, 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 970
(1972). Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (1970) provides in part:
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with chil-
dren must... (7) ... provide that the [administering] State
agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any
other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid
to families with dependent children, or of any other individual
(living in the same home as such child and relative) whose
needs the State determines should be considered in determining
the need of the child or relative claiming such aid, as well as
any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such
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Jurisdiction to hear the equal protection claim was based on 28
U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1970), while the statutory claim5 was considered
under a theory of pendent jurisdiction.6 The district court as-
sumed jurisdiction of the case and decided the statutory claim
in favor of the plaintiff without convening a three-judge court.7
The court of appeals remanded with instructions to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction,8 holding that the plaintiff had failed to pre-
sent a constitutional claim sufficiently substantial to confer juris-
diction on the district court under section 1343 (3).9 Reversing
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that (1) the peti-
tioner had presented a substantial constitutional question, (2) the
district court had correctly exercised its discretion to assert juris-
diction over the pendent statutory claim, and (3) the single-judge
district court was the appropriate forum for the statutory claim.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
The number of cases challenging state categorical assistance
programs on a combination of fourteenth amendment and statu-
tory grounds has increased dramatically in recent years.10 Ha-
gans exemplified the problems that had frequently been encoun-
tered in such cases. In the wake of the Supreme Court decisions
income . .. (10) provide ... that all individuals wishing to
make application for aid to families with dependent children
shall have opportunity to do so, and that aid to families with
dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable prompt-
ness to all eligible individuals ....
The petitioner also claimed that the regulation was in conflict with 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (3) (ii) (1973):
[I]n establishing financial eligibility and the amount of the
assistance payment: . . . (c) only such net income as is actually
available for current use on a regular basis will be considered,
and only currently available resources will be considered ....
5. Although generally characterized as "statutory claims," such
challenges are of course ultimately based on the supremacy clause of
the Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. Under the supremacy clause,
all state laws conflicting with federal welfare law are void to the extent
of the inconsistency. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
6. Pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine that allows fed-
eral courts to hear two closely related claims, one of which would other-
wise fail to satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements, in a single federal
proceeding. See notes 51-64 infra and accompanying text.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) requires that a three-judge panel be
convened to hear any claim that requests an injunction on the ground
that a state statute is in conflict with a provision of the federal Con-
stitution. See note 81 infra.
8. Hagans v. Wyman, 471 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1973).
9. Federal courts are required to dismiss for want of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction those claims that are so weak as to be considered "ficti-
tious" or those similar to a claim that a higher court has previously
found to be without merit. See text accompanying notes 24-25 infra.
10. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 552 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 59:761
CASE COMMENTS
in Dandridge v. Williams" and Jefferson v. Hackney,12 which
gave the states great latitude in allocating welfare funds to the
needy,1 3 equal protection claims against state welfare assistance
programs enjoyed little chance of success on the merits and were
vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a substantial constitu-
tional question.14  On the other hand, the statutory claims fre-
quently were successful on the merits,' 5 but did not appear to
satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements. Such claims ap-
parently involved neither deprivation of "equal rights" within
the meaning of section 1343(3),16 nor violation of protected "civil
rights" within the meaning of section 1343(4).1 Although they
did "arise under" federal law as specified in the general federal
question provision, rarely would they meet the $10,000 amount
in controversy requirement.' s As in Hagans, therefore, these
11. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
12. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
13. State welfare regulations challenged on equal protection
grounds must be upheld under Dandridge and Jefferson if they are ra-
tionally based and free from invidious discrimination. See note 28 infra.
See generaly Recent Case, Equal Protection-A Judicial Cease Fire in
the War on Poverty, 36 Mo. L. REv. 117 (1971).
14. See text accompanying notes 24-29 infra.
15. See, e.g., Story v. Roberts, 352 F. Supp. 473 (D. Fla. 1972); Doe
v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316
F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
16. McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1969). 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) grants jurisdiction:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
The Supreme Court in Hagans expressly reserved the question of the
applicability of section 1343 (3) to statutory claims in the context of wel-
fare administration, 415 U.S. at 533 n.5, and several commentators have
stated that the statute can be construed to embrace such claims. See,
e.g., Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims,
6 HARv. Crv. RIGiws-Crv. Lm. L. REv. 1 (1970); Note, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 COLum. L. Rzv. 1404, 1421-
28 (1972).
17. Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 944 (1972). 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (4) (1970) grants jurisdiction:
To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief
under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil
rights, including the right to vote.
18. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1970). Although aggregation of a number of indi-
vidual claims is a conceptual possibility, the Supreme Court has ruled
against such a practice. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). See Note,
supra note 16, at 1429-35.
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claims were most frequently tried under a theory of pendent ju-
risdiction. 19 Pendent claims, however, must be appended to a sub-
stantial federal question which independently invokes juris-
diction,2 0 and after Dandridge and Jefferson, constitutional chal-
lenges to state welfare regulations were generally not strong
enough to satisfy the substantiality requirement. Consequently,
courts hearing such cases were somewhat vulnerable to the crit-
icism that they were allowing welfare plaintiffs to impose upon
them cases which belonged in state courts.2 1 The final problem
encountered in these cases prior to Hagans arose from the re-
quirement that pendent statutory claims be heard by three
judges along with constitutional claims, 22 even though nonpend-
ent statutory claims did not by themselves require a three-judge
court.23 Trial of these pendent claims by a three-judge court
seemed to add unnecessarily to the already enormous burden
which those courts placed on the federal judiciary.
The Hagans decision diminished the opportunity for substan-
tiality dismissals, clarified the relationship between the doctrines
of substantiality and pendent jurisdiction, and expanded the
power of the single-judge court in the three-judge court context,
thus virtually assuring that pendent statutory challenges to state
welfare schemes will be heard in federal court by a single judge.
1. The Substantiality Ruling
The substantiality doctrine originated in an 1875 enactment
which required district courts to dismiss claims that did not
"really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy prop-
erly within the jurisdiction of [the] district court."24 Substan-
tiality was obviously a vague standard, however, and a judicial
gloss soon accumulated. District courts were directed to dismiss
only those claims which were "obviously without merit" or those
19. E.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Story v. Roberts,
352 F. Supp. 473 (D. Fla. 1972).
20. Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1909).
21. Cf. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), wherein
the Court stated:
[R] ecognition of a federal court's wide latitude to decide ancil-
lary questions of state law does not imply that it must tolerate
a litigant's efforts to impose upon it what is in effect only a state
law case. Once it appears that a state claim constitutes the real
body of the case, to which the federal claim is only an append-
age, the state claim may fairly be dismissed.
Id. at 727.
22. See text accompanying notes 86-88 infra.
23. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
24. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472 (1875).
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whose "unsoundness so clearly result[ed] from the previous de-
cisions of this court as to foreclose the subject .... -25
Despite these nominally stringent limitations upon the use of
the substantiality dismissal, the Supreme Court in practice al-
lowed the lower courts to use the dismissal quite freely. The
Court frequently announced a decision in terms of general consti-
tutional principles which subsequently could be applied broadly
by lower courts to similar factual or legal patterns. Such pat-
terns could be deemed sufficiently analogous to allow a court
to dismiss a claim for want of a substantial federal question even
though the precise issue had not previously been decided.26 If
the tenor and logic of prior Supreme Court decisions dealing with
similar issues indicated that a claim was futile, the court could
dismiss it.27 Equal protection claims were particularly suscep-
tible to such dismissals, since the Supreme Court made it clear
that in most cases, including those involving social welfare pro-
grams, 28 legislative judgments were to be upheld against equal
protection challenges if any rational basis could be found to sus-
tain them.2 9
25. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933).
26. For an excellent discussion on interpreting prior cases for their
maximum and minimum stare decisis value in deciding analogous claims,
see F. LLEELLYN, THE BRAMwLE BUSH 66-69 (1960).
27. See, for example, Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933), wherein
the Court affirmed a substantiality dismissal which depended upon this
type of reasoning by general analogy. Even though the precise issue
had never before been considered, the district court's dismissal was
deemed proper "in view of the decisions of this Court bearing upon the
constitutional authority of the State, acting in the interest of public
safety, to enact the statute assailed." Id. at 32.
28. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972):
So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the leg-
islature's efforts to tackle the probns of the poor and the
needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket.
See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
29. This is the so-called "minimum rationality" standard. Recent
Supreme Court decisions, however, indicate that the Court will no longer
accept assertions of a clearly "hypothetical" rationale in defense of a
state statute. Compare Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), with
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). Even if the case is not one in-
volving "suspect classifications" or "fundamental interests," see Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1065 (1969), the
Court now apparently requires that the classifications and interests as-
serted must be "legitimate and nonillusory." McGinnis v. Royster, 410
U.S. 263, 276 (1973). It has been suggested that the degree of scrutiny
that the Court applies to a particular equal protection claim depends
on the "constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 17-48 (1972).
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Consequently, the court of appeals in Hagans held that the
constitutional claim was insubstantial, 30 and found the chal-
lenged recoupment provision to be rational on its face because
it prevented one impoverished family from receiving a larger
portion of a necessarily limited state welfare fund than another
equally poor family,31 and also encouraged proper money man-
agement by those depending on the state for support.32 The Su-
preme Court disagreed, citing Goosby v. Osser.33 In Goosby, the
first indication that the substantiality dismissal might be falling
into disfavor, the Court had reiterated with greater conviction
the traditionally nominal restrictions on such dismissals:
In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the substan-
tiality of constitutional claims... claims are constitutionally in-
substantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the
claims frivolous; previous decisionm that merely render claims
of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them insubstan-
tial .... 34
In a sense, the Hagans decision extended the Goosby ration-
ale: the equal protection claim in Goosby required careful re-
view under the "strict scrutiny" standard used in cases involving
"fundamental rights, '35 whereas equal protection challenges to
30. Hagans v. Wyman, 471 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Jeffer-
son v. Malcolm, 353 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a paradigm of the
broad substantiality dismissal of an equal protection challenge in the
area of state penal law. The Jefferson court relied on McGinnis v. Roy-
ster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). Although McGinnis had dealt with different
regulations, classifications, and asserted state interests, the court found
in its sweeping language a rule of law sufficiently controlling to dictate
a substantiality dismissal.
31. 471 F.2d at 349-50.
32. Id. at 350. The court reached the same result as two other
courts which had previously relied on Dandridge in the dismissal of
equal protection challenges to welfare programs for lack of a substantial
question. Money v. Swank, 432 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1970); Waier v.
Schmidt, 318 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Wis. 1970). Those cases since Dandridge
which have found a substantial equal protection question in a challenge
to a state welfare law frequently have done so without discussion of the
substantiality issue, instead moving immediately to adjudication of the
pendent claim. See, e.g., Doe v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
33. 409 U.S. 512 (1973) (announced after the court of appeals deci-
sion in Hagans).
34. Id. at 518. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
35. The Goosby Court emphasized the fact that the claim in ques-
tion involved total denial of voting rights and was appropriately re-
viewed under a standard of strict scrutiny. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The voting cases upon which the court
of appeals had relied in granting the substantiality dismissal, however,
concerned claims reviewed under a standard of minimum rationality be-
cause of different alleged facts. See McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807-08 (1969) (prisoners challenging denial of ab-
sentee ballots did not allege that they were also denied all other alterna-
tive means of voting).
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welfare programs as in Hagans have traditionally been measured
against the mild demands of minimum rationality.36 Yet, even
though mere "minimum rationality" was required to sustain the
state regulation, the Court stated:
We are unaware of any cases in this Court specificaly dealing
with this or any similar regulation and settling the matter one
way or the other. Nor is it immediately obvious to us from the
face of the complaint that recouping emergency rent payments
... was so patently rational as to require no meaningful con-
sideration. 37
By thus requiring either "specific" prior decisions rejecting the
claim or "patent" rationality of the regulation, the Court set a
standard far higher than that which the regulation would be re-
quired to satisfy at trial.3 8
The Hagans majority suggested that its decision was con-
sistent with previous application of the substantiality doctrine.39
Justice Rehnquist disagreed. Protesting that "[u]nder today's
rationale it appears sufficient for jurisdiction that a plaintiff is
able to plead his claim with a straight face," he insisted that
under established standards insubstantiality "could [have been]
evident [to the district judge] from recent decisions of this Court
rejecting claims with a similar thesis or laying down rules which
would clearly require dismissal on the merits. '40  Nevertheless,
even if Justice Rehnquist's version of the substantiality doctrine
was correct, several justifications can be enumerated for discour-
aging the practice of dismissing complaints for lack of substan-
tiality. The substantiality doctrine has been justifiably char-
acterized as "a maxim more ancient than analytically sound.' '4 '
Prior to 1938, it may have served an important purpose by pro-
viding lower federal courts, obligated to follow the procedural
law of the states in which they sat,42 a uniform method of dis-
missing very weak causes of action with minimum delay. Since
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, how-
ever, this justification has disappeared. The Court has recog-
nized that substantiality dismissals, though characterized as
"jurisdictional," in effect constitute dismissals on the merits.4 3
36. See note 28 supra.
37. 415 U.S. at 539-41 (emphasis added).
38. The majority seemed to recognize the distinct possibility that
the claim would fail on the merits. Id. at 542.
39. Id. at 538.
40. Id. at 564.
41. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970).
42. The Practice Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196.
43. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962); The Fair v. Kohler
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Consideration of the merits of a case has no place in jurisdictional
decisions, except for a few necessary factual determinations such
as citizenship of the parties or the existence of the federal statute
pleaded. Because federal rule 12 (b) (6), which empowers federal
courts to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted," 44 now provides a uniform mechanism for pre-
trial dismissals on the merits, 45 the substantiality doctrine should
be abandoned as a procedural anachronism.
Admittedly, there may be no reason to believe that the shift
to federal rule 12 (b) (6) will render summary applications of
prior precedent any more logical or predictable. If the substan-
tiality doctrine is allowed to persist in some form in modern fed-
eral practice despite the evolution of federal procedure, its ap-
plication should be severely limited. The doctrine is extremely
vague, for what is "fictitious" or "obviously without merit" to
one judge has not always been equally so to another.40  Unless
cases can be found directly on point, it is therefore preferable
to insist on more carefully considered application of precedent
and to confine jurisdictional issues to basic factual considerations
such as citizenship.
Alternatively, the Hagans substantiality ruling may be nar-
rowly interpreted as an attempt to encourage lower courts to
give more careful consideration to equal protection claims and
to read somewhat more warily the sweeping language of older
equal protection opinions. Such an interpretation would be con-
sistent with recent Supreme Court decisions that have appar-
ently increased the stringency of standards used in equal protec-
tion review, 47 and with the Court's statement in Hagans that its
decision was consistent with the prior law of substantiality dis-
missals. 48 Lower courts, however, have apparently read Hagans
as a directive to engage less readily in substantiality dismissals
in all areas of the law. The Hagans rationale has already been
followed by a court considering the substantiality of a claim in-
volving commercial freedom of speech,49 as well as by numerous
Die & Spec. Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682-83 (1946).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6).
45. See id. 41(b).
46. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 23 (1964).
47. See note 29 supra.
48. 415 U.S. at 538.




courts hearing welfare cases.50 Thus, another Supreme Court
opinion may be required to clarify the limits of the new substan-
tiality doctrine.
2. The Pendent Jurisdiction Ruling
Originally developed to allow federal courts to decide issues
of state law which were closely related to federal claims, the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made exception5 1 to the
rule that federal jurisdiction is determined by the Constitution
and by acts of Congress.5 2 The doctrine was first expounded
in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,53 wherein the Court
recognized federal jurisdiction over state law issues whose
resolution was necessary to the determination of federal claims.
In Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,5 4 the doctrine was
expanded to allow federal courts to try a state law claim which
provided an alternative ground of relief to the constitutional
claim presented. This result was justified largely on the ration-
ale of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. 5 In Hum
v. Ourser,0 the Court allowed federal adjudication of a pend-
ent claim that provided relief in addition to that provided by
the federal claim, so long as the two claims were simply "two
distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action." 57 Hum
was justified explicitly by the argument that a single cause of
action constituted only one "case" in the constitutional sense, and
implicitly by the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation and to con-
serve the resources of both the court and the litigants.58
50. See, e.g., Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208, 1214 (2d Cir. 1974);
J.A. v. Riti, 377 F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.J. 1974). "The [Hagans] test is a
stringent one and calls for the exercise of federal jurisdiction whenever
some colorable doubt concerning the validity of the claim may be enter-
tained .... " Id. at 1049.
51. See C. WRiGHT, HANDBOOK OF TH LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 17-
20, 62-65 (1970).
52. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
53. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
54. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
55. Id. at 193. See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
56. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
57. Id. at 246.
58. See Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 CoLUm. L. REV. 1018, 1022 (1962).
By thus allowing relief in addition to the federal relief requested, Hurn
marked the point at which the Court turned away from the earlier view
expressed in Osborn that pendent jurisdiction was intended to serve only
the necessities and interests of the federal courts.
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The implicit policy of Hum, was eventually made explicit in
the leading modern case, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,"9 the
holding of which was based squarely upon "judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to litigants." 60 In Gibbs, the plaintiff
sought recovery under a provision of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act of 194761 and under the common law of Tennessee for
incidents arising out of an interunion conflict and a mine shut-
down. The Supreme Court sustained jurisdiction over the com-
mon-law claim because it shared a "common nucleus of operative
fact"62 with the "substantial" federal question presented under
the National Labor Relations Act. The Court cautioned, how-
ever, that this jurisdiction was discretionary, to be exercised only
when actually dictated by considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to litigants. The Court further enu-
merated several corollary rules which were to serve as safeguards
against attempts to impose upon the federal court cases that
belonged in state courts. First, of course, the pendent claim was
required to be appended to a "substantial" federal claim. 3 Sec-
ond, if the federal claim was dismissed before trial, the pendent
claim was also to be dismissed. Third, if the pendent claim pre-
dominated over the federal claim, the pendent claim was to be
dismissed without prejudice. Fourth, if a separate trial would
be required for the pendent claim it ordinarily was to be dis-
missed. If the pendent claim involved important matters of fed-
eral policy, however, federal adjudication was to be more se-
riously considered. 64
Citing Gibbs, the dissenting Justices in Hagans argued that
the Court's decision would bring within the cognizance of the
59. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
60. Id. at 726.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
62. 383 U.S. at 725. During the years between Hum and Gibbs, the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had resulted in
substitution of the term "claim" for the term "cause of action," see FED.
R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (2); thus the Hurn rule, see text accompanying note 57
supra, had been rendered obsolete.
63. After Gibbs, the lower courts were in conflict as to the degree
of substantiality required to sustain the pendent claim. Although there
would be no jurisdiction over even the federal claim if it were not in
some sense "substantial," some courts believed it should be still more
"substantial" to justify the addition of a pendent claim. Compare Shaw-
Henderson, Inc. v. Schneider, 335 F. Supp. 1203, 1217 (W.D. Mich.), aff'd,
453 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1971) (higher degree of substantiality required
of federal claim to support jurisdiction over a pendent claim), with
United States ex rel. M.G. Astleford Co. v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 53
F.R.D. 656, 660 (D. Minn. 1971) (standards for substantiality identical
regardless of whether issue is federal question or pendent jurisdiction).
64. 383 U.S. at 725-27.
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federal courts many claims appended to very weak federal claims
that prior to Hagans would have been dismissed.6 5 The allega-
tion of a very weak federal claim indicated, in their opinion, that
the plaintiff in truth expected recovery under the pendent claim,
and was likely to concentrate his time and resources on it. 66
Thus, consideration of such claims was contrary to the directive
of Gibbs that pendent claims were to be dismissed whenever they
dominated the litigation. They also argued that, in sustaining
a claim appended to "a federal constitutional claim as marginal
as the one at issue here,"6' 7 the majority had infringed upon the
congressional prerogative to leave "to state courts not only those
claims involving state law, but also those claims involving federal
law which it felt did not merit the time of federal courts. 68
In further support of the dissenters' views, it should be noted
that the Court's additional holding that pendent claims arising in
a three-judge court context should be tried first in a single-judge
court60 effectively vitiated another of the Gibbs directives: that
the pendent claim was to be dismissed if the federal claim, even
though not insubstantial in the jurisdictional sense, was dis-
missed before trial.70 Although constitutional claims as weak as
the one in Hagans are vulnerable to dismissal under federal rule
12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, such a dismissal would be on the merits7'l and therefore
beyond the limited powers of the single-judge court.7 2 Thus, by
65. 415 U.S. at 558-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Since the dis-
senting Justices found the constitutional claim to be insubstantial, they
believed that the Court lacked power to hear the whole case, much less
the pendent claim. See text accompanying note 63 supra. To them, the
new stringent limitations on the substantiality doctrine threatened an in-
crease in the number of marginal federal questions capable of support-
ing pendent claims.
66. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra. Said Justice Rehn-
quist:
Whether the equal protection claim pleaded in this case meets
the threshold of substantiality for jurisdiction in the federal
courts, the claim surely should not convince a district court that
its main purpose was anything other than to secure jurisdiction
for the more promising Supremacy Clause claim.
415 U.S. at 564-65.
67. Id. at 551 (Powell, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. See text accompanying notes 93-96 infra.
70. 383 U.S. at 726. See, e.g., Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015
(N.D. I1. 1967).
71. FED. R. Crv. P. 41(b). See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying
text.
72. Rosenthal v. Board of Educ. of Cent. High School Dist. No. 3,
497 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1974). See note 81 infra. See also P. BATOp, P.
MsHwn , D. SAPImO & H. WucHsLuu, HART AmD WFCHSLER's THm FEDERAL
19751
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prescribing prior and separate trial of the pendent claim before
a single judge, the Hagans Court has effectively denied the de-
fendant any opportunity to preliminarily challenge the weak con-
stitutional claim on the merits, and thereby to challenge reten-
tion of the pendent claim under the Gibbs directive. Conse-
quently, the potential for abuse of pendent jurisdiction is mater-
ially increased.
The majority, however, focused on certain factors which, de-
spite the weakness of the constitutional claim, dictated federal ad-
judication of the pendent statutory claim. Since the pendent
claim was potentially dispositive of the entire case, one such
factor was the policy in favor of avoiding unnecessary constitu-
tional decisions. 73 An extensive effort to avoid a constitutional
question would appear rewarding, however, only if the question
thus avoided were difficult or novel. Since the constitutional
challenge in Hagans was so weak that its failure was virtually
a foregone conclusion, the avoidance argument is not persuasive.
More significantly, the Court found that the predominantly
federal nature of pendent statutory claims involving welfare is-
sues provided a compelling reason to prefer federal adjudica-
tion.74 While the Court did not fully elucidate this argument,
there are several reasons why the federal courts should be avail-
able to hear such issues: (1) the validity of state categorical as-
sistance programs frequently turns on federal law, which federal
courts are likely to implement more uniformly and expertly; 75
(2) the magnitude of federal expenditures for categorical assist-
ance programs dictates a federal forum to protect federal fiscal
interests; (3) federal courts are more likely to afford sympathetic
treatment to federal welfare statutes and relevant decisions of
the Supreme Court;76 (4) discrimination against minorities, who
comprise a large percentage of those receiving welfare funds, is
less likely in federal than in state courts; and (5) federal courts
tend to have greater regard than do state courts for the constitu-
tional liberties of welfare recipients. Consideration of such fac-
COURTS Aim =a FEDERAL SYSTm 972 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM].
73. 415 U.S. at 547 n.12, 549. See notes 54-55 supra and accompany-
ing text.
74. 415 U.S. at 548-50. The importance of welfare programs to soci-
ety 'as a whole may also have dictated federal adjudication of such
claims. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256 (1970).
75. 415 U.S. at 550; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
727 (1966).
76. See Mishkin, The Federal "Questio" in the District Courts, 53
CoL m . L. Rsv. 157, 159 (1953).
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tors is clearly consistent with the Gibbs decision, which itself re-
lied heavily on the federal interest in the issues presented by
the pendent claim.77 The Hagans majority thus did not ignore
the weakness of the constitutional claim but found that, balanced
against it, the importance of welfare programs to society and the
federal nature of the statutory issue provided sufficient justifica-
tion for federal adjudication of the pendent claim.
The Court failed, however, to describe explicitly the balanc-
ing process by which the strength of the federal interest in the
pendent claim offset the weakness of the constitutional claim.
The Court's bald statement that "given advantages of economy
and convenience, and no unfairness to litigants," the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction contemplates that such claims be heard,78
taken either in isolation or in light of the substantiality ruling,79
could indeed "broaden federal question jurisdiction to encompass
matters of state law whenever an imaginative litigant can think
up a federal claim . . ."80 It would thus seem best to inter-
pret Hagans narrowly as a decision that involved specific federal
policies dictating that a particular type of claim be heard in fed-
eral court. In other cases the weakness of the federal claim
might not be offset by considerations as weighty as those sur-
rounding the pendent claim in Hagans; in such situations the
pendent claim should be dismissed.
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the Hagans decision
on pendent jurisdiction is simply that judicial action was re-
quired to resolve the problem. Congress has been remiss in not
creating federal jurisdiction over statutory challenges to state
welfare regulations without regard to the amount in controversy.
3. The Three-Judge Court Ruling
The three-judge court provisionss ' were originally enacted
in response to a controversial series of cases in which single-judge
courts enjoined state economic measures on the now discredited
77. 383 U.S. at 727.
78. 415 U.S. at 546.
79. See text accompanying notes 24-50 supra.
80. 415 U.S. at 551 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81. The basic provision is 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970):
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the en-
forcement, operation or execution of any State statute by re-
straining the action of any officer of such State . . .shall not
be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the
ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the ap-




ground of economic due process.8 2  Although more radical
restraints on the federal judiciary had also been proposed,83 the
special dignity of the three-judge court, its ability to prevent a
single biased judge from obstructing an entire state program, and
the provision for direct appeal to the Supreme Court84 all sug-
gested that the three-judge court would be an adequate com-
promise between state sovereignty and federal constitutional su-
premacy.
The general increase in the scope of pendent jurisdiction over
the last forty years 8 has naturally led to an increase in the num-
ber of claims appended to constitutional claims requiring a three-
judge court. In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen,8 6
the Court responded to an argument that the three-judge court
was not the appropriate forum for such a pendent claim:
Section 2281 ... seems clearly to require that when, in any ac-
tion to enjoin enforcement of a state statute, the injunctive de-
cree may issue on the ground of federal unconstitutionality of
the state statute, the convening of a three-judge court is nec-
essary. .... 87
The Court rested its decision primarily on its perception of con-
gressional intent.88
The first indication that Florida Lime Growers might no
longer be good law 9 appeared in Rosado v. Wyman,00 wherein
a state welfare regulation was challenged on constitutional and
statutory grounds. A three-judge court was convened and the
arguments heard, but the court was dissolved prior to decision
when the constitutional claim became moot. The Supreme Court,
deciding that a single-judge district court could nonetheless
subsequently rule on the pendent claim, suggested in dictum that
"[e] yen had the constitutional claim not been declared moot, the
82. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); R. JACKSON, THE
STR U Gr FOR JuDcICAL SuPmcRAY 50 (1941).
83. Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HIav. L. B~v. 795, 804
& n.29 (1934).
84. Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying,
after notice and hearing, an... injunction in any civil action
..required ... to be heard and determined by a district court
of three judges.
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
85. See text accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
86. 362 U.S. 73 (1959).
87. Id. at 80.
88. Id. at 81.
89. Florida Lime Growers had been twice confirmed. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966); Paul
v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1962).
90. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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most appropriate course may well have been to remand to the
single district judge for findings and the determination of the
statutory claim. . ."91 But this suggestion, explicitly based on
considerations of judicial economy and convenience to litigants,
was only dictum; and the peculiar procedural posture of the case
cast some doubt on its significance.92 The courts which dealt
with this issue after Rosado reached varying results. While some
heard the pendent statutory claim without convening a three-
judge court,0 3 others convened a three-judge court, which
promptly remanded the case to the single judge to hear the pend-
ent claim. 4 Most courts simply continued to try the pendent
claim in the three-judge court proceeding.9"
Hagans clarified the propriety of separate proceedings for
pendent statutory claims, reaffirming that such claims should be
heard first if potentially dispositive, and holding that, contrary
to Florida Lime Growers, they need not be decided by three
judges:
[T] he coincidence of a constitutional and statutory claim should
not automatically require a single-judge district court to defer
to a three-judge panel, which, in view of what we said in Rosado
v. Wyman... could then merely pass the statutory claim back
to the single judge.96
Hagans in this respect is consistent with "the recent evolution
of three-judge court jurisprudence," 97 which seems to be es-
sentially an attempt to reduce the number of cases required to
be heard by three-judge courts,98 since such courts are a tremen-
91. Id. at 403.
92. Rosado did not require the overruling of Florida Lime Growers,
inasmuch as the outcome of Rosado could be explained solely on the
basis of considerations of pendent jurisdiction. Since substantial judicial
resources had already been invested in hearing the pendent claim, which
had originally been properly before the court, Rosado best furthered the
policies of judicial economy and convenience to litigants by completing
consideration of the pendent claim.
93. E.g., Bryant v. Carleson, 444 F.2d 353 (3d Cir. 1971).
94. E.g., Weintraub v. Hanrahan, 435 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1970).
95. E.g., Story v. Roberts, 352 F. Supp. 473 (D. Fla. 1973); Doe v.
Schmidt, 330 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
96. 415 U.S. at 544.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (single-judge
court can enjoin a statute which is so clearly unconstitutional on its face
that there is no "substantial" constitutional question); Idlewild Liquor
Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1961) (court of appeals has jurisdiction
to review decision of single-judge court to dismiss a claim for lack of
a substantial constitutional question without impaneling a requested
three-judge court). See generally Currie, Appellate Review of the Deci-
sion Whether or Not to Empanel a Three-Judge Federal Court, 37 U. Cm.
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dous burden on the federal judiciary. 9 In Swift & Co. v. Wick-
ham'00 the Court, resting its decision solely on the ground of
judicial economy, had already held that an independent statu-
tory claim did not by itself actuate the three-judge court mech-
anism. Hagans merely extended the Swift result by removing
pendent statutory claims from the cognizance of three-judge
courts.
This element of Hagans can be questioned on two grounds,
neither of which is mentioned in any of the opinions. First, it
contravenes the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, which usually
realizes the goals of judicial economy and fairness and conven-
ience to litigants through the practice of trying separate but re-
lated claims in a single proceeding.' 0 ' It is said that the power
to hear such related claims exists only if the "plaintiff's claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all
in one judicial proceeding,"' 02 and that any contingency making
separate trials of the federal and pendent claims necessary should
ordinarily lead to dismissal of the latter.10 3 Therefore, to the
extent that the Hagans decision allows a separate proceeding to
hear the pendent claim, it is inconsistent with the achievement
of judicial economy and convenience to litigants. By thus under-
mining the policy of pendent jurisdiction, the Court weakens the
arguments supporting the constitutionality of that doctrine.10 4
Second, while the Court sought by narrow construction to mini-
mize the adverse impact on the federal judiciary of the three-
judge court provisions, 0 5 it is not clear that the decision will
serve that objective. Whenever the pendent claims fail, a three-
judge court must still be convened to hear the constitutional
questions, with the result that multiple litigation occurs at the
trial level. The overall consequence may well be an increase in
L. REv. 159 (1969); Currie, Three Judge District Court in Constitutional
Litigation, 32 U. Cnx. L. REv. 1 (1964).
99. Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59
A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1973); Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-
1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1053 (1972).
100. 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
101. See text accompanying notes 51-64 supra.
102. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
103. Id. at 727. See also Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316
(1927): "[The whole tendency of our decisions is to require a plaintiff
to try his whole cause of action and his whole case at one time." Id.
at 320, quoting United States v. California & Ore. Land Co., 192 U.S.
355, 358 (1904).
104. See text accompanying notes 51-52, 69-72 supra.
105. See 415 U.S. at 544. See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers
v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 86 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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the workload of the federal courts, the very problem which a
narrow construction of the three-judge court provisions was in-
tended to ameliorate.
In light of two additional factors, however, the three-judge
court ruling may be acceptable. First, in cases like Hagans
where the constitutional claims are exceptionally weak, the
plaintiff is likely to move for voluntary dismissal if the pendent
claim is unsuccessful, rather than waste time and resources liti-
gating a constitutional claim that will almost certainly fail. Sec-
ond, the Hagans decision will contribute to judicial economy by
removing pendent statutory claims from the direct appeals pro-
vision of the three-judge court statutes.10 6 Under section 1253,
three-judge court decisions may be appealed directly to the Su-
preme Court as of right, regardless of whether the state statute is
upheld or struck down; under section 1254,107 however, if the
statute is upheld, the claim can reach the Court only on certiorari,
which is granted or denied in the Court's discretion. s0 8 Twenty
percent of the cases heard by the Supreme Court in recent years
have come to it by direct appeal from a three-judge court.109 The
Hagans decision, by suggesting that the pendent claims be tried
in a separate proceeding, would channel appeal of such decisions
through section 1254, thereby reducing the burden on the Court.
Furthermore, even if a statute is ruled unconstitutional by the
court of appeals, thus rendering the decision appealable to the
Supreme Court as of right, whatever discretion the Court in fact
exercises in considering such appeals can be more confidently ex-
ercised when two lower courts have considered the merits of the
claim." L Such considerations justify the Court's decision to try
the pendent claim in a separate proceeding even though such a
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). See note 84 supra.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by the following methods:(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party
to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judg-
ment or decree;(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a
court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States ....
108. See Sup. CT. R. 19. See generally FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FED-
EAL SYSTEm, supra note 72, at 1609-16.
109. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary--1972, 58 A.B.A.J.
1049, 1053 (1972).
110. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGERous BRANcH 126 (1962). But
see Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on




procedure departs from the consolidated proceeding traditionally
associated with an exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
Thus, in order to reduce its workload, the Court has been
forced to interpret the three-judge court provisions in a manner
inconsistent with the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Many
judges and commentators have recommended abolition or sub-
stantial modification of the three-judge court procedure."' The
justification for the procedure is much less convincing than it
was in the era of economic due process, and the burden which
the procedure places on the federal judiciary is much greater.
Congress should, as Chief Justice Burger has repeatedly sug-
gested,1 12 abolish the three-judge court provisions, or at least
greatly narrow their scope. Meanwhile, the Court will continue
to construe those provisions narrowly in order to minimize the
burden on the federal judiciary." 3
4. Conclusion
While each of the three individual rulings in Hagans, taken
in isolation, is at least partially justifiable in terms of prior doc-
trine, the interplay among the three created significant anoma-
lies.1 4 In simultaneously restricting the effective scope of the
substantiality doctrine," 5 ignoring several of the factors which
Gibbs indicated should require dismissal of a pendent claim," 6
and approving the practice of trying pendent claims in a separate
proceeding," 7 the Court evinced a willingness to accept doctrinal
inconsistency to attain the desired goal of federal adjudication
of welfare claims under circumstances least burdensome to the
federal courts. If the decision is to be criticized, part of the
blame must be assigned to Congress, which has not reviewed the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in any depth since 1958.11 The
111. See, e.g., FEDERAL CouT An THE FEDERAL SYsTEM, supra note
72, at 975; Currie, The Three Judge Court in Constitutional Litigation.,
32 U. CHi. L. R v. 1, 76 (1964).
112. Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59
A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1973); Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-
1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1053 (1972).
113. Cf. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 95 S. Ct.
289 (1974) (if a three-judge court dismisses on grounds which wouldjustify its dissolution, appeal lies to the court of appeals rather than the
Supreme Court).
114. See text accompanying notes 65-72, 101-04 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 24-50 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 51-80 supra.
117. See text accompanying notes 81-113 supra.
118. The 1958 amendments merely raised the amount in controversy
requirement and prohibited removal of workmen's compensation cases.
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federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, is vastly over-
worked,11 9 spends much of its time considering legal questions
irrelevant to federal concerns,120 and, as in Hagans, must oc-
casionally announce otherwise undesirable decisions in order to
hear certain classes of cases which are of great federal import.
Prior to Hagans, the American Law Institute had proposed that
three-judge courts be convened only if requested by the state,12 1
and that the amount in controversy requirement be eliminated
for federal claims. 2 2 If Congress had acted upon those propos-
als, the need for both the pendent jurisdiction and three-judge
court rulings of Hagans would probably have been obviated, and
the Court would have been relieved of the necessity of delivering
a doctrinally unsatisfying decision.
Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1970)).
119. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 578-79 (1972).
120. H. FRmNDLY, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION 139-52 (1973); Burger, Re-
port on the Federal Judiciary-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1973).
121. ALI STUDY ON THE DiVrsioN OF JURISDICTION BErwE k STATE
AND FEDERAL CouRTs § 1374 (1969).
122. Id. § 1311 (a).

